Controlling the Effects of Factionalism

Madison in writing Federalist paper number ten devoted the topic to the mischief of faction. Faction for this essay will subscribe to his definition of being “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. Madison stated that the only cure for factions were by either removing its causes, or controlling its effects. He concluded, rightfully so, that removing the causes were impracticable as groups of people forming differences of opinions was the basis of liberty to citizens. It is the second cure of controlling the effects of factions that will be of consequence and review of the American citizen after two hundred years of observation of the current form of republican government can be accounted.

As presented in earlier essays, elected officials through a changing society and exhaustive needs of financing have in fact become what Madison defined as a faction. Their allegiances to party and self, in the way of seeking and obtaining elected office, have become their primary requisite and supplanting the will of the public good to which they were elected. If this conjecture holds true, then it is relatively simple to understand why election reforms will not come to fruition as an inherent bias in judgment exists. Madison confirms this through the following statement, “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time”.

However, Madison’s conclusion is the following when dealing with controlling the effects of factions. He states, “The second expedient [controlling factions] is as impracticable as the first [removing the causes of factions] would be unwise”. His end determination is that a republican form of government is in fact the answer as a democracy, as a form of government, would give rise to the greater causes of factionalism. Madison doesn’t actually explore any other alternatives, such the effects of changing the nature or design of elected offices or elections themselves in an effort to control the effects of factions. Madison concludes that the will of the majority is the natural conclusion of the effects of factions and is justified as remedies and not of injustice upon the minority. He also concludes that sheer numbers of elected person would not allow oppression of the minority and disregard of the public interest. But how many times over the last two hundred years has the American citizens seen disregard for the public good by the majority of the congress? Too many examples can be found.

Several controls can be established to control or limit the effects of factions within the congress relating to the governing process. Redefining the congress would be one way of control. Establishing through the amendment process or by convention, a series of sub-houses of the House of Representatives or Senate would be one way. Establishing 3 sub-houses of congress each with defined core responsibilities or duties under an amended constitution could curtail internal factionalism. Thus, even if there were elected officials, it would be possible to create the need to build consensus amongst the factions in order to establish a majority.

Another control would be to change our method of representation in whole or part, the offices of the congress. If sub-houses were created in congress and a certain number of representatives were not elected, but rather selected as in a jury style approach, this would also limit the effects of factionalism in the case of political parties or career politicians. If some number less than the whole was selected rather than elected, and for a period as short as 1 year, the effects of political parties and need for raising monies from lobbyists and election pacs for future elections would be greatly diminished.

A secondary benefit to this approach is a greater guarantee that more of the population of the country’s different classes of people would make up the congress. Currently, the make up on congress is weighted towards lawyers. If the president is a lawyer, the congress made up of lawyers, and the Supreme Court made up of lawyers, then we have by Madision’s definition of faction, one faction and no diversity within the our government. It is strange that diversity in our government in this manner is never mentioned by our elected officials. But again, the American citizen is now referred back to Madison’s statement concerning individual bias.

Vox Vocis res Publica


http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm