Controlling the Effects of Factionalism cont'd...

In continuing the discussion of factionalism, by Madison’s definition, the American citizen can find numerous examples of why the current form of government doesn’t nearly control those effects enough to the detriment of the country. Once again, Madison’s definition of factionalism states, “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. Madison believed that factionalism was inherently linked to liberty and thus, a necessary part of the governing process. Citizens expressed their opinions and created legislation based on those opinions. What needed control was the adverse effect of group-think that would lead to legislation that impeded or trampled a class of citizen’s rights; or was not in the best interest of the community. One other concern that should be of note to the American citizen is the role factionalism has in impeding legislation or preventing the will of the American people on any particular topic.

One example can be found in the current debate of health-care reform. While there are many competing voices, many if not all can agree that reform is necessary and has been necessary for a number of election cycles over the last fifty years. But in all this time, very little has been done. While only two parties make up the entire congress, both of which agree reform is necessary. The two political parties disagree on methods but what is interesting to note is the entire lack of compromise which is inherent and necessary to resolve political disagreements. And in the background, the minority special interest of the American Medical Association through its use of lobbyists and campaign contributions seem to successfully block any attempt at reform. Thus, the minority faction of those who provide healthcare to the country are thwarting the best interests of the community by denying badly needed reform and healthcare coverage to those who have either too little or no healthcare at all.

In the previously stated example, factionalism can be found in two ways. The first way is the normal and healthy discourse of the self-governing process, the two parties that don’t compromise. While this can be a detriment and somewhat of an obstacle to the governing process, it is in fact a normal event and part of the decision making processes of government. The second is the adverse effect of factionalism warned and needing controlling as seen by Madison; a small group citizens somehow banding together to deny other citizens rights or having an adverse effect on the community. A group, who though political contributions affect legislator’s decisions and reasoning because of the effects of contributions to campaigns for elections or re-elections.

It is because of the ill effects of the second effect of factionalism, that construction or design of the elected offices of both the House of Representatives and the Senate must be remodeled under the American citizen’s right to formulate a working government. A redesign of the offices with more appropriate checks and balances are needed to mitigate the effects of adverse factionalism. Both houses of the legislature should be remodeled.

There are several options to mitigate the adverse effects of factionalism. One would be to have term limits. If legislators knew they were only going to be in the House or Senate for only one term, this would stop the ill effects of needing to raise monies for a re-election campaign and lessen the influence of lobbyists. If the American citizen felt that having statesmen with tenure and experience was needed, longer terms could be enacted. If a senator could only be elected once and the term being 10 years, it is possible this could reduce the influence of lobbying efforts for re-election. Another way would be to have a ‘recall’ or removal process for citizens to remove a sitting senator or representative other than the election process. The former would be of better construction than the ladder as the ladder would require additional action be taken by the electorate.

However, reform of this nature is unlikely as the interested parties exist in a symbiotic nature to the detriment of the citizens of the United States. Until the American citizen exercises his and her right to construct or reconstruct a working government to address the needs of the country, problem may only be addressed at the point of collapse or in dire consequence as now seen by the current economic crisis. Again this scenario was a result of a smaller faction (Wall Street financial institutions) having adverse effects on the country through their lobbying efforts to strip away safeguards within the banking industry to suit their own interests. Elected officials gave way to the banking interests in order to raise funds for future elections or for fear of reprisal of the banking industry.

Vox Vocis res Publica


http://www.alternet.org/healthwellness/140628/obama_must_take_on_the_giant_lobbyists_blocking_health_care_reform/

http://www.pnhp.org/blog/2008/08/29/posturing-coalitions-the-latest-attempt-to-block-health-care-reform/

Controlling the Effects of Factionalism

Madison in writing Federalist paper number ten devoted the topic to the mischief of faction. Faction for this essay will subscribe to his definition of being “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”. Madison stated that the only cure for factions were by either removing its causes, or controlling its effects. He concluded, rightfully so, that removing the causes were impracticable as groups of people forming differences of opinions was the basis of liberty to citizens. It is the second cure of controlling the effects of factions that will be of consequence and review of the American citizen after two hundred years of observation of the current form of republican government can be accounted.

As presented in earlier essays, elected officials through a changing society and exhaustive needs of financing have in fact become what Madison defined as a faction. Their allegiances to party and self, in the way of seeking and obtaining elected office, have become their primary requisite and supplanting the will of the public good to which they were elected. If this conjecture holds true, then it is relatively simple to understand why election reforms will not come to fruition as an inherent bias in judgment exists. Madison confirms this through the following statement, “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time”.

However, Madison’s conclusion is the following when dealing with controlling the effects of factions. He states, “The second expedient [controlling factions] is as impracticable as the first [removing the causes of factions] would be unwise”. His end determination is that a republican form of government is in fact the answer as a democracy, as a form of government, would give rise to the greater causes of factionalism. Madison doesn’t actually explore any other alternatives, such the effects of changing the nature or design of elected offices or elections themselves in an effort to control the effects of factions. Madison concludes that the will of the majority is the natural conclusion of the effects of factions and is justified as remedies and not of injustice upon the minority. He also concludes that sheer numbers of elected person would not allow oppression of the minority and disregard of the public interest. But how many times over the last two hundred years has the American citizens seen disregard for the public good by the majority of the congress? Too many examples can be found.

Several controls can be established to control or limit the effects of factions within the congress relating to the governing process. Redefining the congress would be one way of control. Establishing through the amendment process or by convention, a series of sub-houses of the House of Representatives or Senate would be one way. Establishing 3 sub-houses of congress each with defined core responsibilities or duties under an amended constitution could curtail internal factionalism. Thus, even if there were elected officials, it would be possible to create the need to build consensus amongst the factions in order to establish a majority.

Another control would be to change our method of representation in whole or part, the offices of the congress. If sub-houses were created in congress and a certain number of representatives were not elected, but rather selected as in a jury style approach, this would also limit the effects of factionalism in the case of political parties or career politicians. If some number less than the whole was selected rather than elected, and for a period as short as 1 year, the effects of political parties and need for raising monies from lobbyists and election pacs for future elections would be greatly diminished.

A secondary benefit to this approach is a greater guarantee that more of the population of the country’s different classes of people would make up the congress. Currently, the make up on congress is weighted towards lawyers. If the president is a lawyer, the congress made up of lawyers, and the Supreme Court made up of lawyers, then we have by Madision’s definition of faction, one faction and no diversity within the our government. It is strange that diversity in our government in this manner is never mentioned by our elected officials. But again, the American citizen is now referred back to Madison’s statement concerning individual bias.

Vox Vocis res Publica


http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm